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This paper investigates the association between the corporate governance and the 
dividends payout policy for a panel of Indian corporate firms over the period 1994-
2000. We explain the differences in the dividend payout behavior of the firms with 
the help of firm’s financial structure, investments opportunities, dividend history, 
earnings trend, and the ownership structure. We find a positive association of 
dividends with earnings and dividends trend. Debt equity ratio is found to be 
negatively associated, whereas past investment opportunities exert a positive impact 
on dividends. Ownership by the corporate and directors is positively related with 
dividends payout in level, and corporate ownership is negatively related in square. 
Institutional ownership has inverse effect on dividends in comparison to corporate 
ownership in levels as well as in its squares. We find no evidence in favor of 
association between foreign ownership and divided payout growth. 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G35. 
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Dividend payout has been an issue of interest in financial literature. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that information asymmetry between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsider’ may lead to agency cost. One of the mechanisms, they suggest to reduce 
‘outsiders’ expropriation is to reduce free cash flows available to managers through 
high payouts by the firm in from of dividends and share repurchases. Dividends are 
referred to as rewards for providing finances to a firm in the l iterature, as without any 
dividend payout, shares would not have any value. Dividend payout policy has been 
the primary puzzling factor in the economics of corporate finance since the work of 
Black (1976). The dividend literature has primarily relied on two lines of hypothesis: 
signaling and agency cost. The cash flow hypothesis asserts that insiders have more 
information about firms’ future cash flow than outsiders do, and they have incentive 
to signal that information to outsiders.  
 
Dividends can be an i deal device for limiting rent extraction of minority 
shareholders. Large shareholders, by granting dividends, may signal their 
unwillingness to exploit them. Dividend payout, however guarantees, equal payout for 
both insider and outsider equity holders. Corporate governance in India differs 
dramatically from the dominant form of corporate governance in US, UK and other 
developed economies. Even within India, corporate governance is not homogenous; 
some firms operate as business group firms while others operate as stand alone firms. 
Group firms differ in depth and breadth of inter-firm relationship than stand alone 
ones. Ownership structure in India differs from most of the Anglo-Saxon countries 
like the US and UK. In India, large shareholders (especially directors and corporate) 
have ample incentives and ability to control. Empirical research on corporate governance and dividend payout policy has mostly concentrated for developed 
economies like US, UK and Japan. In US, regulated and dispersed shareholding leave 
salient agency problems between managers and shareholders. In emerging market 
economies like India, widely held corporations are in the minority and are mostly held 
in few hands (block shareholders). 
 
In this paper, we examine whether differences in ownership structure and 
owners identity across firms can explain their dividend payout differences in India. 
Using a large sample of Indian corporate firms over 1994-2000, our aim is to answer 
the following: Does shareholders identity matter? If it does, then, whether directors’ 
ownership is more effective than foreign ownership, corporate ownership, or 
institutional ownership in determining the firm’s dividend payout policy? Does 
dividend signal any conflict between the insider (manager) shareholders and outside 
shareholders? Does dividend change provide any new information about this conflict? 
Are dividends a method of aligning insider’s interests with those of outside investors? 
Do group-affiliated corporations in India pay higher dividends than stand-alone  firms, 
dampening insider expropriation? Does taxation policy influence payout decisions? 
 
Our paper makes at least three major contributions to the literature, on the 
issue of corporate governance and dividends payout policy. First, we provide an 
evidence  of the relationship between ownership structure and dividends payout for an 
emerging market economy. Second, we provide a more robust model to explain the 
dividends payout behavior using detailed historical information of the ownership 
structure, capital s tructure, investments opportunity, past dividends, and earnings 
trend. Thirdly, this is the very first example of using principles of corporate governance in the context of the dividends payout, by providing evidence of the 
different behavior by different class of owners. We document that ownership is one of 
the important variables that influence the dividend payout policies. The relationship 
between ownership and dividends is different for different class of owners and at 
different levels, which suggests t hat influence of the ownership structure on dividend 
payout policy is non-linear. The impact changes with the change in the holding size as 
well as with their identity. We expect that firms, for which the interest alignment 
between different classes of owners is more likely to be severe, pay out less of their 
earnings as dividends. We test this proposition by estimating the modified partial 
adjustment model. 
 
Our paper now proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the existing 
literature and provides a  brief introduction to economic and legal framework within 
which Indian corporate firms operate and its implication for dividend payout policy. 
Institutional details are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data and variable 
constructions. The methodology used and the obtained results are presented in Section 
5. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Substantial literature in the field of corporate finance (Linter (1956), Linter 
(1962), Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985)), suggests that the corporate 
dividend policy is designed to reveal earning prospects of a firm to their investors. 
Recent empirical evidence in favor of this model are mixed. Fama and Babiak (1968) 
argues that the firms, a priori, set their target dividend level and try to stick to it. In 
addition to the signaling approach, there may be interrelation between dividend payout policy and agency costs of the firm (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook 
(1984)). Dividend payout policy is an outcome of the conflict between the insiders 
and the outsiders (issues related with corporate governance and ownership structure). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982), and Easterbrook (1984) presents agency 
cost explanations for changes in dividend payout, while analyzing whether dividends 
can act as a method to align manager’s interests with those of investors. They argue 
that the firm pays dividends in order to reduce agency costs, as payment of dividends 
reduce the discretionary funds available to managers. Jensen (1986) documents that in 
presence of free cash flows, the firms pay dividends or retire their debts to reduce the 
agency cost of free cash flow. Kalay (1982) investigates a large sample of bond 
indentures focusing on conflict between shareholders and bondholders on the 
dividend decision. The paper finds that the stockholders do not pay themselves as 
much dividends as they are allowed to. Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) examine the 
determinant of cross-sectional differences in insider ownership, debt, and dividend 
policy. The authors’ find that firms with higher insider ownership chooses lower level 
of debt and dividends.  
 
Han, Lee, and Suk (1999) test the agency cost based hypothesis, which 
predicts, dividend payout to be inversely related to the degree of institutional 
ownership and the tax based hypothesis, predicting the dividends to be positively 
related with the institutional ownership. They provide support for the tax-based 
hypothesis, suggesting a “dividend clientele” for institution’s preference for higher 
dividends. Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) argue that the 
dividends play a basic role in limiting insider expropriation because they remove the 
corporate wealth from insider control. They find that corporations in countries with strong legal protection of minority shareholders pay higher dividends. Faccio, Lang, 
and Young (2001) relate dividends rates to the discrepancy that exists between the 
shareholder’s ownership rights and its control rights. The ratio of ownership and 
control rights is used as a measure of the corporation’s vulnerability to insider 
expropriation within a group of corporations. The authors find that significantly the 
corporations that are tightly affiliated pay higher dividends to a  business group. By 
contrast, for corporations not tightly affiliated to a group is associated with 
significantly lower dividend rates. They provide evidence on the expropriation that 
takes place within business groups and on the differences in expropriation between 
Europe and Asia.  
 
Fenn and Liang (2001) analyze how corporate payout policy is affected by 
managerial stock incentives. They find that managerial stock incentives mitigate the 
agency costs for firms with excess cash flow problems. They also find a strong 
negative relationship between dividends and management stock options. Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003), and Gugler (2003) investigate the relationship between dividends, 
ownership structures and control rights for German and Austrian firms, respectively. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find large shareholding of the largest owner reduces the 
dividends payout ratio, while shareholding by the second larger owner increases it. 
Gugler (2003) documents the evidence that state controlled firms engage in dividend 
smoothing, while family controlled firms do not. The behavior of the bank and 
foreign controlled firm lies in between state controlled and family controlled firms, 
consistent with the expected “ranking” of information asymmetries and managerial 
agency cost hypothesis.  
 The literature on signaling hypothesis builds upon the pioneering work of the 
Bhattacharya (1979), who derived the existence conditions for a non-dissipative 
signaling model and show that dividends are signals for future cash flows, under the 
assumption that outside investors have imperfect information about the firm’s 
profitability and the cash dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. Miller 
and Rock (1985) extend the standard finance model of the firms dividend by allowing 
the firms manager ‘insider’ to know more about the firm’s financial health than 
‘outside’ investors. They show that a consistent signaling equilibrium exists under 
asymmetric information. Healy and Palepu (1988) examine whether dividend policy 
changes convey information about the future earnings substantiated by cash. They 
find that investors interpret announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as 
manager’s forecast of future earnings changes. Brennan and Thakor (1990) develop a 
theory of choice for  distribution of cash from firm to shareholders. They show that a 
majority of a firm’s shareholders may support a dividend payment for small 
distribution, despite the preferential tax treatment of capital gains for individual 
investors. For larger distributions as open market stock re-purchase, and for the 
largest distributions tender offer re-purchases is likely to be preferred by a majority of 
shareholders. 
 
In case of India, Kevin (1992) shows that dividend stability is a primary 
determinant of payout while profitability is only of secondary importance. Mahapatra 
and Sahu (1993) do not find evidence in support of the Linter’s model, whereas 
Mishra and Narender (1996) find support for the Linter’s model in case of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Bhat and Pandey (1994) find that payments of dividends 
depend on current and expected earnings as well as the pattern of past dividends. Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if 
there is profitable investment opportunity. M ohanty (1999) attempts to examine the 
behavior of payout after the bonus issue. He finds that bonus-issuing firms yielded 
greater returns to their shareholders than those that did not make any bonus issue but 
maintained a steadily increasing dividend rate. Reddy (2002) examines the dividend 
behavior and attempts to explain the observed behavior with the help of a trade-off 
theory and signaling hypothesis. The paper supports earlier finding that dividend 
omissions have information content about future earnings, but do not find any 
evidence in support of the tax-preference theory. Roy and Mahajan (2003) provide 
regulatory oversight on dividends payout and suggest that regulation of dividend 
payout should address the inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and 
lenders to address the issue of information asymmetry between the insiders and the 
outsiders. The empirical evidence concerning the possible association of owners and 
payout policy is extremely limited, nearly none in case of emerging market 
economies, especially for India. Most of the studies have tried to explain these 
phenomena of dividends and institutional shareholders in developed countries. In a 
recent study Short, Keasey, and Duxbury (2002) examine the link between dividend 
policy and institutional ownership for UK firms. They find a positive association 
between dividends and institutional shareholders and negative association with 
managerial ownership. In emerging market economies like India, Korea, Taiwan, 
China etc., the institutional s etup is quite different than those of the developed 
countries. Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003) find that emerging market firms exhibit 
dividend behavior similar to those of US. However, the authors do not consider the 
corporate governance issues. Manos  (2003), using data from India, estimates the cost 
minimization model of dividends and finds that government ownership, insider ownership, risk, debt, and growth opportunities, have a negative impact on the payout 
ratio, whereas institutional ownership, foreign ownership and dispersed ownership 
have a positive impact on the payout ratio. However, his analysis is based on cross-
sectional data. 
 
3. Institutional Details 
Large shareholders, like other emerging market economies, characterize 
Indian corporate firms’ ownership structure. Majority control gives the largest 
shareholder incentive and control over key decisions, like dividend payout. The 
dominance of large shareholders may affect the dividend payout in several ways. 
There have been changes in the taxation policy for dividend during the sample period, 
which gives us an opportunity to test the tax-preference theory and its implications for 
the dividend payout in case of an emerging market economy, India. India operates a 
classical company tax system in which companies are taxed separately from the 
investors receiving the profits in form of dividends. Firms pay differential rate of 
corporate tax on their profits and shareholders pay income tax on the dividend income 
received. 
 
This leads to twice taxation o f profit earned by firm, one in the hands of 
company through corporate tax and other in hands of investors, in form of income tax. 
In such a case an investor should prefer to get less dividends paid and earnings to be 
retained by firm, as they can always g et the amount by selling the shares in equity 
market, in form of ‘home made dividend’ (Black (1976)). Taxation policy is a key 
determinant of payout in developed countries (see Short, Keasey, and Duxbury 
(2002)). In case of India taxation policy is different than those of developed countries. In India, before June 1, 1997 dividends were taxable as income in the hands of the 
shareholders. The law was amended with effect from June 1 1997, shifting the burden 
of dividend tax from the shareholders to the companies. This remained till March 31 
2002. Hence, from June 1 1997 to March 31, 2002, domestic companies distributing 
dividends were liable to pay a dividend distribution tax and the dividend was exempt 
in the hands of the shareholders. Dividend payout may be beneficial, if used to offset 
tax liability against the capital loss, as after dividend payments, the prices of stocks 
fall. The signaling perspectives suggest that insiders use dividends as a signal of 
firm’s future earnings. Most of the signaling and agency cost models assumes that 
there is separation of ownership and control and finance is raised externally through 
capital markets. However, the characteristic of financing in India is different than 
those of the developed nations. In India, most of the financing comes from financial 
institutions, and these lenders also have equity holding (in general) in the firm 
concerned. Hence, they have access to insider information as well. This reduces the 
importance of dividends as a signal of firms’ financial health. We focus our attention 
on Indian corporate sector as an experimental setting as the Indian corporate sector 
offers the following advantages over other emerging market economies. 
 
The Indian Corporate Sector has large number of corporate firms, lending i t to 
large sample statistical properties. It is large by emerging market economy’s standard 
and the contribution of the industrial and manufacturing sectors (value added) is close 
to that of in several advanced economies. Unlike several other emerging market 
economies, firms in India, typically maintain their shareholding pattern (dominant 
group) over the period of study, making it possible to identify the ownership 
affiliation of each sample firm with clarity. It is by and large a hybrid of the “outsider systems” and the “insider systems” of corporate governance. The legal framework for 
all corporate activities including governance and administration of companies, 
disclosures, share-holders rights, dividend announcements has been in place since the 
enactment of the Companies Act in 1956 and has been fairly stable. The listing 
agreements of stock exchanges have also been prescribing on-going conditions and 
continuous obligations for companies. India has a well-established regulatory 
framework for more than four decades, which forms the foundation of the corporate 
governance system in India. Numerous initiatives have been taken by Securities 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to enhance corporate governance practice, in 
fulfillment of the twin objectives: investor  protection and market development, for 
example: streamlining of the disclosure, investor protection guidelines, book building, 
entry norms, listing agreement, preferential allotment disclosures and lot more. 
Although the Indian Corporate Sector is a mix of government and private firms 
(which are again a mix of firms owned by business group families, and multi 
nationals and stand alone firms), it has not suffered from the cronyism that has 
dominated some of the developing economies. Accounting system in India is well 
established and accounting standards are similar to those followed in most of the 
advanced economies (Khanna and Palepu (2000)). This increases our confidence in 
the reliability of using Indian data. 
 
4. Data and Variable Construction 
This section is sub-divided in two parts: in sub-section 1, we introduce our 
data. Sub-section 2 briefly focuses on some key variables. 
 
4.1. Data The firm level panel data for our study is primarily obtained from the 
corporate database (PROWESS) maintained by Center for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE). The data used in the analysis consists of all manufacturing firms 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), for which we could get their historical 
share holding pattern along with the dividend payout ratio and o ther explanatory 
variables used in the study. We confine our analysis to BSE listed firms only because 
all the listed firms are required to follow the norms set by SEBI for announcing the 
financial accounts. The BSE also has the second largest number of domestic quoted 
companies on any stock exchange in the world after NYSE, and more quoted 
companies than either the London or the Tokyo stock exchange. We analyze data 
from 1994 to 2000, as this is the period for which we have the most coverage in the 
database.   
 
To construct the data sample, we start with all companies listed in Prowess 
database. We exclude Public Sector firms as their dividend payments are highly 
influenced by a large number of social obligations, which may be difficult to account 
for. We a lso exclude financial firms and utilities because their dividend polices are 
highly constrained by external forces. We restrict our analysis to firms that have no 
missing data (on share holding pattern and dividends) for at least two consecutive 
years. We  finally end up with 2575 firms resulting in an unbalanced panel of 5,224 
observations. For this unbalanced panel of 5,224 observations, we collect the 
following additional data for each firm observation: Earnings, Gross Sales, Total 
Assets, and Debt to Equity ratio. Despite the problem of attrition and missing data, 
our sample provides several distinct advantages over the samples used in earlier 
studies.   
As noted earlier, a distinct form of corporate governance exists in India. A 
distinguishing feature of the Indian corporate sector is the existence of industrial 
groups, which are predominantly family firms. For this study, we distinguish those 
firms that are member of groups from those that are independent. Membership in a 
corporate group is not easily defined. Similar to the prior studies like Khanna and 
Palepu (2000), we adopt the classification of CMIE, which classifies firms as group 
members if they exhibit strong group ties over the period of their existence. We look 
at the dividend cuts and increases, as well as the dividend omissions. Cuts and 
increases are defined as negative or positive growth in annual dividends respectively; 
in India most of the firms pay annual dividends unlike US, where dividends are paid 
quarterly. Dividend omissions are identified, if the firm’s annual dividend is zero. We 
perform our analysis after restricting the dependent variable to lie between 1st and 
99th percentile to tackle the problem of outliers. 
 
4.2. Key Variables 
The key variables of the interest are dividend payout ratio in percentage of 
their shares’ face value (Div), managerial shareholding (director) (A number of 
studies, for example, Mork, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) have used board of directors’ 
equity holdings as a proxy for managerial ownership.), institutional investors 
shareholding (institutional), foreign investors shareholding (foreign), and corporate 




2)  and (corporate
2)  to examine the presence of non-linearity in 
ownership effect after a certain threshold. We also use growth in earnings, debt-equity 
ratio and growth in sales intensity as controls. Year dummies are also included to control for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. A dummy variable (measuring 
the change in tax regime) is also included to control for potential tax clientele effects.
1 
In order to examine the well-established dividend models in Indian context, dividends 
are calculated as the total amount of ordinary dividends relating to the accounting 
year. Earnings are calculated as net profit derived after depreciation, interest, and 
taxes, available for distribution to shareholders. In Table 1, we provide a detailed 
description of the variables used in our analysis.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This section is divided in two sub-sections: sub-section 1 presents the 
empirical model. The descriptive statistics and regression results are presented in sub-
section 2. Sub-section 3 analyses the endogeneity of ownership and in sub-section 4, 
we present results of some sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.1. Empirical Model 
For testing the hypothesized link between ownership and dividend policy, we 
use following models: the Full Adjustment Model (FAM), the Partial Adjustment 
Model (PAM) (Linter (1956)), the Waud Model (WM) (Waud (1966)), the Earnings 
Trend Model (Fama and Babiak (1968)) and the modified model of firm level 
characteristics proposed by Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003). We further modify 
these models to account for the potential association between the ownership variables 
and dividend policy in lines with Short, Keasey, and Duxbury (2002). 
 
5.1.1. The Full Adjustment Model (FAM) The association between change in earnings (Ear) and change in dividends 
( Div D ), for firm i at time t, is given by: 
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  (2) 
The coefficients  , , , , d i f c and b b b b   denote the respective impacts of foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership, managerial (directors) ownership, and corporate 
ownership in association to the dividend payout ratio of the firm to the change in the 
earnings. 
 
5.1.2. The Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) 
According to this model, dividends paid are the result of a partial adjustment 
towards a target payout ratio. The change in dividends is determined by the difference 
between last year’s dividend and this year’s target payout level, which is assumed to 
be a fixed proportion of the earnings. In any given year firm adjusts partially to the 
target dividend level. Hence, the model becomes: 
it 1) (t   i
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where,  b is the rate of adjustment to target payout ratio. Inclusion of ownership 
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5.1.3. The Waud Model (WM) 
According to the Waud model, dividends paid are the result of ‘the partial 
adjustment’ and ‘the adaptive expectations’. Waud proposes a second order rational 
distributed lag order model. 
2 
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5.1.4. The Earnings Trend Model (ETM) 
Fama and Babiak (1968) proposes a modified ‘partial adjustment model’ for 
dividend analysis.  
In our case, the modified model takes the following form: 
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5.1.5. The Proposed Model (PM) 
In view of Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), dividends 
play a basic role in limiting insider expropriation by removing corporate wealth from insiders’ control. Under the assumption that the managers are not perfect agents of 
owners, Easterbrook (1984) propose two forms of agency cost, the cost of monitoring, 
and cost of risk aversion on parts of managers. In Indian context, Bhat and Pandey 
(1994), on the basis of a survey of managers’ perspective about dividend payment and 
retention, claim that dividend depends on current and expected earnings as well as the 
pattern of past dividends. They also document that dividend helps in signaling the 
future prospects of the firm, and dividends are paid even if the firm has profitable 
investment opportunity. In order to measure the investment opportunity across firms 
over time, we use past growth in sales intensity (defined as the ratio of gross sales to 
total assets). This measure was also used in (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2000)).
3  Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) argues that tax penalty associated 
with dividend payments depends on the tax rate of the firm’s investors, but all firms 
have access to same pool of investors and hence face the same potential tax penalty. 
Therefore, we would expect differences in dividend policy to be driven by factors 
other than taxes. However, we use tax dummy (for change in tax regime) in some of 
the regressions, which suggests that the change in taxation policy has no impact on 
dividends payout policy for Indian corporate firms. 
 
Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003) examine the influence of firm-level 
characteristics on the dividend decision. We however, propose a modified version of 
the model suggested by Linter (1956), Waud (1966), Fama and Babiak (1968), Short, 
Keasey, and Duxbury (2002) and Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003). We propose 
that the dividend policy is influenced by the dividends payment of previous years as 
managers of a firm are reluctant to change the current dividend from past years 
dividend payment, unless they are unable to maintain it. We also note that dividend payments are not only determined by the past dividends, but also by current and past 
earnings, investment opportunities, firm’s capital structure (measured as Debt-Equity 
ratio) and the ownership structure of the firm. We use past growth in sales intensity as 
a proxy for investment opportunity included on the ground that higher historic growth 
might render dividends p olicy less relevant for inducing primary market monitoring. 
The inclusion of the debt equity ratio is mainly motivated by its potential monitoring 
role on managers. In particular, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that financial 
leverage play a role in reducing agency costs arising from the owner-manager 
conflict.  
In our set-up, hence we propose the following model: 
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where, dividend intensity is defined as the ratio of dividends to total assets. We also 
control for unobserved firm-effects ( i a ) and  it µ denotes the error term. We use 
different specification of this model to  capture the impact of ownership structure and 
observed firm-level characteristics. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) argue that although 
ownership and performance measures like return to total assets may be endogenous, it 
is unlikely that ownership and dividends  are endogenous. We, therefore, believe that 
our results are robust to the endogeneity problem. However, we provide some 
empirical evidence in favor of our belief about the endogeneity issue in Section 5.3. 
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics and Regression Results Table 2 reports industry-wise (2-digit NIC code) distribution of observation 
for each year. Summary statistics relating to the dependent variable and explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 3 for each year, and for the full sample. We observe 
that t he mean level of dividend payments have significantly increased over the period, 
from 2.96% in 1994 to 3.41% in 2000. During the sample period the PBDIT (Profit 
before Depreciation, Interest and Tax) have remained almost stable from Rs. 27 
Crores in 1994 t o Rs. 33 Crores in 2000. We also find that even when the earnings 
growth rate has been negative ( -0.002%), the dividend payments have been growing 
at the rate of 0.47% for full sample. This trend is consistent for all the periods in the 
sample. This may in turn, imply that the change in dividend payments are not solely 
determined by the change in earnings. The mean levels of foreign ownership have 
been decreasing from 11.73% in 1994 to 10.84% in 1997 to finally at 10.20% in 2000. 
Institutional investors’ holding have remained more or less stable during the period 
form 1.91% in 1994 to 1.55% in 1997 to 1.59% in 2000, while that of directors’ and 
corporate’ have been significantly increasing. Mean level of retained profit by firms 
have also been reducing from 7.19 in 1994 to 5.29 in 1997 to 4.76 in 2000. 
 
We use dividend growth as a dependent variable in this analysis unless 
otherwise stated. The results of the modified Linter model are shown in Table 4. 
Column 1 reports the result for dividend growth with time and industry dummies at 2-
digit level. The coefficients of the lagged dividends are significant: first lag have 
negative impact while that of the second is positive. Current earnings (Ear) have 
positive and significant effect. In column 2, we restrict our analysis to a sample of 
firms without zero dividend growth. Result remains same as before while magnitude 
of the effect increases marginally. In column 3 and 4, we repeat the same analysis with fixed-effects panel regressions. We infer that after controlling for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, lagged dividends have no explanatory power in explaining current 
dividends. However, if we restrict our analysis to firms without zero dividends 
growth, results remains unaltered. Our results provide support for the L inter Models 
in presence of change in dividends payout. This result is in contrast to the results of 
Mahapatra and Sahu (1993) but corroborates the result of Mishra and Narender 
(1996). 
 
The results for the modified full adjustment model (FAM) are shown in Table 
5. Column 1 reports result with time and industry dummy at the 2 -digit level. The 
coefficient of the earnings growth and interaction term of earnings growth with 
director’s shareholding is positive, while the interaction term of institutional 
shareholding with earnings growth is negative and significant. Interaction of tax 
dummy with the earnings variable yields a negative and significant coefficient. In 
column 2, we control for unobserved firm-effects. Here we also use an indicator 
dummy taking the  value of one for that owner who has the maximum share-holding 
among the ownership groups, and zero otherwise. Our finding remains same as before 
in terms of institutional ownership. However, interaction of tax dummy with the 
earnings variable looses its significance. We also perform similar exercises with other 
indicator variables constructed at different levels of ownership (for example 5%, 10% 
and 25%). We present the result for the 25% threshold in column 3. We document 
that the interaction term of earnings with institutional ownership has a negative 
impact on dividend payout. Our result is in sharp contrast to the findings of Short, 
Keasey, and Duxbury (2002). 
  In Table 6 we present regression results for the modified partial adjustment 
model (PAM). Results for dividend growth with time and industry dummy at the 2 -
digit level are reported in column 1. The coefficient for earnings is positive and 
significant, while the interaction variables (earnings with different ownership 
shareholding), in case of institutional and corporate, are negative and significant. We 
also document that the coefficient of the interaction term of earnings with group firm 
yields a negative significant coefficient. In column 2 of Table 6, we report the results 
of the fixed-effect regression. Results remain the same as in case of column 1 except 
the fact that the coefficient associated with ‘corporate’ and ‘group’, looses their 
significance, while that of the ‘director’ enters with a negative significant coefficient. 
In column 3, we u se an indicator dummy taking the value of one for that owner who 
has the maximum shareholding among the ownership groups, and zero otherwise. We 
obtain similar results with interaction between indicator dummies (maximum) and 
earnings, as in case of column  2, except ’director’ looses its significance. In columns 
4, 5 and 6, we use indicators for the level of shareholding at 5%, 10%, and 25%, 
respectively. These indicator variables take the value of one if the shareholding by a 
particular group is more than t he threshold level, zero otherwise. In case of 5% and 
10%, as a thresh hold level, only first lag of dividend turns out to be significant with 
negative coefficient, none of the ownership variables are significant even at 10% level 
of significance. In column 6, with 25% as the level for designing our indicator 
variable, we find similar results as in case of indicator at the maximum level (column 
3). We also note that except in the first case (column 1), lagged dividends always 
enters with a negative significant coefficient. 
 The results of the modified earnings trend model (ETM) are presented in 
Table 7. Column 1 reports the results for dividend growth with time and industry 
dummy at the 2 -digit level, while the results controlling for unobserved firm-effects 
are presented in other columns. In column 1, the coefficient for the current earnings 
(Ear) is positive and significant and the interaction term of ‘corporate’ with past 
earnings is negative and significant. In column 2, we report the results where 
interaction terms are constructed using actual values of share holding and earnings. In 
this case the coefficient of the interaction between ‘director’ and ‘corporate’ 
shareholding with earnings is negative and significant. As before, we also construct an 
indicator dummy taking the value of one for that owner who has the maximum 
shareholding among the ownership groups, and zero otherwise. Results (Column 3) 
indicate that none of the interaction terms (interaction between lagged earnings and 
shareholding of different owners) is significant. The results in terms of this interaction 
variable remains the same if we use the ownership threshold at 5%, 10% or at 25% 
level. Our result also indicates that past dividend has negative and significant impact 
on dividends growth while current earning has positive and significant impact. 
 
The results of the modified Waud Model (WM) are presented in Table 8. The 
results for dividend growth with time and industry dummy at the 2 -digit level are 
reported in column 1 and that with fixed-effects in Column 2. In column 1, earnings 
exert positive and significant impact, while the coefficients of the interaction terms of 
earnings with ‘institutional’, ‘foreign’, and ‘corporate’ are negative and significant. 
The coefficient of the second lag of the dividend variable is positive and significant. 
Introduction of firm-effects (Column 2) changes our result. Other than current earnings and the interaction of current earnings with ‘institutional’ shareholding, all 
other variable looses their significance.  
 
In Table 9, we present the results for our proposed model of dividends payout 
policy. Instead of using dividends growth, here we use dividend intensity (defined as 
the ratio of dividends and total asset) as the dependent variable. The results with time 
and industry dummy at 2 -digit level are reported in column 1 while that with firm 
specific fixed-effects is represented in other columns. The coefficient of lagged 
dividend intensity, earnings intensity and growth in sales intensity is positive and 
significant in column 1, whereas that of debt equity ratio is negative and significant. 
We document that none of the ownership variables are significant. Controlling for 
unobserved firm-effects (column 2) does not alter our results in case of earnings 
intensity, growth in sales intensity and debt-equity ratio. However, the impact of 
shareholding by the ‘director’ turns out to be significant and positive. The result 
corroborates the findings of Short, Keasey, and Duxbury (2002). In column 3, we also 
try to  capture the non-linear effect of ownership variables. In order to do so, we use 
squares of ownership variables. From column 3, we can infer that earnings intensity, 
first lag of earnings intensity, and growth in sales intensity are all positive and 
significant. Suggesting that past profitability captures information on future growth 
prospects, and possibly because more profitable firms are more likely to grow in 
future, a higher level of dividends payout is observed. Impact of debt-equity ratio is 
negative and significant.  
 
Our results in terms of ownership variable gives an interesting picture: the 
coefficient of ‘institutional’ ownership has non-linear impact on dividend intensity: negative in level and positive in squares, whereas that of ‘director’ and  ‘corporate’ 
exert positive effect in levels and negative effect in squares. This result of non-linear 
relationship between institutional shareholder and dividends intensity may be inferred 
as act of institutional investors as monitors of the firm managers, thus dampening in 
principle the need for high corporate payouts. However, it also suggests that 
institutions may influence higher dividends payouts by a company to enhance 
managerial monitoring by external capital markets, as their own direct monitoring 
efforts may be insufficient or too costly. However, the square of the shareholding of 
the ‘director’ is not significant.
4  In columns 4, we report the regression results with 
indicator dummies constructed for ownership variables at maximum level that is if a n 
investor group has maximum stake in the firm (among the four) then the dummy for 
that investor group takes the value of one and zero for other investor groups. Column 
5, 6, and 7 report the results of regression analysis with indicator dummies 
constructed for the group of owners, which takes the value of one if the shareholding 
is greater than 5%, 10%, and 25%, respectively zero otherwise. Results indicate that 
when foreign or institutional investors have majority shareholding, dividends payout 
is positively related with their stake. This implies that the foreign shareholders have 
positive and significant impact of dividends payout only in case when they have the 
majority shares in the firm. Our results indicate that if the shareholding by the foreign 
or i nstitution is highest then the ownership variable exerts a significant positive 
impact on dividend intensity. Use of indicator dummy for the ownership at other 
thresholds (at 5%, 10% and 25%), yields the following: in case of indicator at 5% 
threshold, the shareholding by the ‘corporate’ has positive and significant impact on 
dividend intensity, while in case of indicator at 25% threshold, ‘institutional’ shareholding has positive and significant impact. The results from Table 9 establish 
that the effect of ownership varies across different class of owners.  
 
In order to investigate our findings further, we use the piece wise linear 
(spline) specification. The results with the spline specification for the ownership 
variable are presented in Table 10. For this analysis, we create spline nodes at 5%, 
10%, 25%, and above.
5 We re-estimate the modified versions of the well-established 
dividend models, namely FAM, PAM, WM, and ETM. In column 1, we report the 
results for FAM, we find that ‘foreign’ has negative and  significant impact, if the 
holding is between 10-25% and has positive and significant impact if the holding 
crosses the threshold limit of 25%. Negative and significant effect is obtained for the 
‘institutional’ shareholding, if the holding lies between 10-25%, whereas in case of 
‘corporate’ shareholding, the impact is positive and significant in case the holding is 
between 5 -10%. In column 2, we report the results with the modified Partial 
Adjustment Model (PAM). The coefficient of the interaction term between earnings 
and ‘foreign’ has positive and significant effect, if the foreign shareholding lies 
between 5 -10%. The effect is negative and significant if their shareholding is between 
10-25% and becomes positive and significant if their holding increases  beyond 25%. 
The shareholding of ‘institutional’ investor has negative impact if the holding lies 
between 10-25%. In case of ‘corporate’ shareholding, we find that they exert negative 
significant impact till their holding is below 5%, positive significant e ffect if it is 
between 5 -10% and again negative effect if holding crosses 25%. Results with the 
shareholding pattern of foreign remains the same in case of modified Waud Model 
(WM, column 3). However, none of the other ownership variables are significant i n 
case of modified Waud Model. The regression results for the modified Earnings Trend Model (ETM, column 4) documents that that interaction term between first 
lagged value of earnings and ‘corporate’ has negative impact if the holding is above 
25%. 
 
5.3 Is Ownership Structure Endogenous? 
Even though our results provide strong evidence that the firm’s dividend 
payout policy is related to the proportion of the shares held by different group of 
owners, one could argue that  outsiders, foreign outsiders, and institutional outsiders 
may only invest in a specific type of Indian firms that are well managed and profitable 
or vise versa, implying that the causal direction is in opposite direction. We address 
this concern by investigating the explanatory power of the d ividends trend in 
explaining the shareholding of an investor group. Specifically the following 
regressions are estimated, for each group of owners: 
i(t-1)i (t-2)
i (t-3)it







where Dividend Intensity is defined as before, Foreign, Institutional, Corporate, and 
Director’s ownership, are used as the dependent variable in each regression 
respectively. Regression results are presented in Table 11 ( Panel A), similar 
regressions are also estimated using Dividends, instead of dividend intensity, results 
are provided in Table 11 (Panel B).  
 
We do not find any lag of the dividends payout to have significant impact on 
any groups of the ownership variables. To investigate this issue further, we estimate a 
three stage least square (3SLS) regression. We have four equations in this case for the 
four ownership groups and one equation for the dividends intensity. We estimate these equations in simultaneous equations framework. Our specification follows 
closely that of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001).  Specifically, the following equations 
are used, for each group of owners: 
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For the dividends intensity we use the following equation: 
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(10) 
Results of the regression are presented in Table 12. We do not find any lag of the 
dividends intensity to be significant in explaining any of the ownership variables. 
Result is qualitatively same as the one reported in Table 9, in case of dividends 
intensity in as the dependent variable.  
 
However, one may argue that though ownership is not endogenous in case of 
dividends payout, it may be endogenous in case of performance.
6 In particular, 
outsiders, foreign outsiders, and institutional outsiders may be targeting a specific 
type of Indian firms for their investments. They may be systematically going after 
quality ore they may be systematically seeking out under performing assets. To 
address this issue, we have interacted incremental change in ownership variables w ith 
the performance of the firm. We use ROA (return over assets defined as a ratio of 
profit before depreciation and tax to total assets), ROE (return over equity defined as 
a ratio of profit before depreciation and tax to total equity), and Sales Intensity 
(defined as a ratio of total sales to total assets) as different measures of performance 
in this analysis. The sign of the significant interaction variables may provide some insight about the behavior of the ownership group with the change in the performance. 
For example: if the coefficient of the interaction variable for foreign ownership and 
performance is positive and significant, one may infer that with increase in the firm 
performance, foreign ownership also has positive impact on the dividends. In 
particular, we estimate the following model: 
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The results are reported in Table 13. We find that the Institutional  have 
negative and significant impact of the dividends payout in linear term and positive in 
square term, which is consistent with our earlier findings, see column 3 of Table 9. 
Only incremental holding by directors, interacted with performance is found to  be 
significant. No other ownership variable’s incremental change interacted with the 
performance is found to be significant. That is to say that the outsiders, outside 
foreigner or institutional investors are not seeking out over/under performing assets. 
The causality is from the ownership structure to the dividends payout policy rather 
than from dividends payout to the ownership structure and ownership structure is not 
significantly influences by the performance or the dividends payout behavior of the 
firm. 
 
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis One may argue that the definition of the dividends intensity may bias the 
result in the suggested model. To further investigate, we redefine our dividend 
intensity variable, as a ratio of dividends and operating cash flow (div_opcflow), ratio 
of dividends and total income (div_totinc). We re-estimate our proposed model with 
these variables as our independent variable in the model. The results are provided in 
Table 14. Once again our results qualitatively remain the same as reported in the 
Table 9. We find that the earnings intensity is significant and positive, debt equity has 
negative influence (insignificant), corporate and director ownership has positive effect 
in linear term and negative impact in squares, institutional investors (foreign) have 
negative (positive) impact in linear in and positive (negative) in square terms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper offers an empirical examination of the agency theory explanation 
for the distribution of dividends policy in India, especially, analyzing the relationship 
between the ownership structure, corporate governance, and dividend payout using a 
large panel of Indian corporate firms over 1994-2000. To the best of our knowledge, it 
is the first attempt to use the well-established dividend payout models to examine the 
impact of ownership structures on dividend payout policies in context of an emerging 
market economy, India.  
 
We find that ownership is one of the important variables that influence the 
dividend payout policy. However, the relationship is different for different class of 
owners and at different levels. This suggests that the ownership structure does not 
influence dividend pay out policy of the firm uniformly. The results support the 
hypothesis that the interest alignment between different classes of owners influences the dividend payout policy. Further research may extend the present use of dividend 
payout models to examine the influence of ownership identity in case of other 
emerging market economies. Examining the influence of board structure on dividend 
payout policy would be an interesting exercise. However, this is left for future 
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61(316), 134–145. Table 1: List of Variables 
 
Abbreviation  Description 
Dividends Payout (Div)  Dividend is the total amount of dividend paid per share in the accounting year. 
Since in India, mostly dividends are paid annually (not quarterly), we 
construct our variable on basis of yearly dividend payments per share. 
Dividend Intensity (Div Int)  Defined as the ratio of the dividends payments to total assets. 
Foreign  Foreigners’ Share Holding is equity held by foreigners as percentage of total 
equity shares. These include foreign collaborators, foreign financial 
institutions, foreign nationals, and non-resident Indians. 
Institutional  Governments’ and Financial Institutions’ Share Holding is shares held by 
government companies as percentage of total equity shares. These includes 
insurance companies, mutual funds, financial institutions, banks, central and 
state government firms, state financial Corporations and other government 
bodies. 
Corporate  Corporates’ Share Holding is equity held by Corporate bodies as a percentage 
of total equity shares. These include corporate bodies excluding those already 
covered. 
Director  Directors’ Share Holding is equity held by Directors of the firm as defined in 
section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956., which includes the shares held by the 
family members (or the persons acting in concern) of the director. 
Earnings (Ear)  We use net profit of the firm as the earning for the year. This is the revenue 
available to a firm for the distribution of the shareholders. 
Earnings Growth (EG)  Earnings growth is calculated as the percentage increase in the current 
earnings from the past earnings. 
Earnings Intensity (Ear Int)  Defined as the ratio of the net profit to total assets of the firm. 
Group Dummy  This dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a business group, 0 
otherwise. 
Tax Dummy  This dummy takes the value of 1 for the period before 1997, and 0 otherwise 
to indicate the change in the pattern of tax on dividends. Prior to the year 
1997, dividends were taxed in the hands of the investor (receiver), whereas, 
from 1997 onwards dividend tax is deducted by the firm at the source. 
Debt-Equity Ratio  Defined as the ratio of total debt to the equity capital of the firm, to measure 
the leverage. 
Sales Intensity (Sale Int)  Defined as the ratio of the gross sales to total assets of the firm. 
Growth in Sales Intensity  Calculated as the percentage increase in the current year from the past year 
ROA (Return over Assets)  Ratio of Profit before depreciation, interest and tax (PBDIT) to total assets 
ROE (Return over Equity)  Ratio of PBDIT to equity capital 
 
 Table 2: Data structure for NIC-2 digit Industry code 
Based on the industrial classification of National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), 
India’s National Industrial Classification 1998.
Nic-2 Digit  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Total 
11- Petroleum And Natural Gas    2  20  15   15    6   16    74 
12- Mining Of Uranium And Thorium Ores      3  4    6    1    3    17 
13- Mining Of Metal Ores            3    1    1     5 
14- Other Mining And Quarrying   1   9  11   11   14    5   15    66 
15- Manufacture Of Food Products And 
Beverages 
15  35  72   70  106   58  118   474 
16- Manufacture Of Tobacco Products   1   2   3    3    7    1    7    24 
17- Manufacture Of Textiles  19  49  80   77  121   61  120   527 
18- Manufacture Of Wearing Apparel; Dressing 
And Dyeing Of Fur 
 1   7  10   10   15   10   10    63 
19- Tanning And Dressing Of Leather   5   5   5    9   10    4   16    54 
20- Manufacture Of Wood And Of Products Of 
Wood And Cork 
 1   2   3    6    7    1   10    30 
21- Manufacture Of Paper And Paper Products   5  10  18   22   37   18   26   136 
22- Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of 
Recorded Media 
 2   1   6    5    6    3    8    31 
23- Manufacture Of Coke, Refined Petroleum 
Products And Nuclear Fuel 
 1   1   6    9    9    5    8    39 
24- Manufacture Of Chemicals And Chemical 
Products 
38  70  149  165  245  150  237  1054 
25- Manufacture Of Rubber And Plastics 
Products 
14  22  63   53   75   41   79   347 
26- Manufacture Of Other Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products 
11  22  35   42   58   17   56   241 
27- Manufacture Of Basic Metals  19  31  54   77   93   46  101   421 
28- Manufacture Of Fabricated Metal Products, 
Except Machinery And Equipment 
 2   8  22   18   25   17   21   113 
29- Manufacture Of Machinery And Equipment  22  38  57   69   86   45   79   396 
30- Manufacture Of Office, Accounting And 
Computing Machinery 
 2   2   4    5   10    5   20    48 
31- Manufacture Of Electrical Machinery And 
Apparatus 
10  17  43   39   51   27   45   232 
32- Manufacture Of Radio, Television And 
Communication Equipment And Apparatus 
 7  10  17   30   31   14   30   139 
33- Manufacture Of Medical, Precision And 
Optical Instruments, Watches And Clocks 
 1   2  10    9   14    9   12    57 
34- Manufacture Of Motor Vehicles, Trailers 
And Semi-Trailers 
 8  16  28   33   56   21   48   210 
35- Manufacture Of Other Transport Equipment   1   2   4    9   10    6   11    43 
36- Manufacture Of Furniture     2   8    9   11    8   15    53 
40- Electricity, Gas, Steam And Hot Water 
Supply 
4   4  4    4   10    2    6    34 
45- Construction            1      1     1 
51- Wholesale And Retail Trade      1  1       16     3 
65- Transport, Storage And Communications      2             2 
70- Real Estate Activities              1     1 
72- Computer And Related Activities    9  19  16  35  30  54   163 
92- Sewage And Refuse Disposal, Sanitation 
Products 
          1       1 
97- Recreational, Cultural And Sporting Goods        1    1       2 
98-Diversified  7  10  10  22  34  10  21   123 
Total  197  388  776  843  1201  624  1195  5224 Table 3: Summary statistics for each year 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 
Full Sample 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Skewness  Kurtosis IQR (Inter 
Quartile 
Range) 
Year  1994 
Observations  197 
Dividends  2.959391  9.715776  0  6.627972  57.7392  1 
Dividend-Growth  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Net-Profit  10.48041  29.84264  1.92  5.205815  33.0931  6.05 
Earnings-Growth  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Sales  176.2538  417.5419  42.6  5.950523  49.95196  127.32 
Total-Assets  209.7125  498.3326  49.19  4.610557  29.21531  123.2 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  0.8322449  5.519481  0.975  -7.409476  79.65936  1.27 
PBDIT  27.40299  64.00343  6.92  4.848675  31.72239  17.99 
Equity-Capital  14.71431  26.06845  5.63  3.861602  20.90323  11.58 
Operating Cash Flow  0  0  0  .  .  0 
Total Income  179.9762  423.6937  44.37  5.871463  48.65261  129.9 
Foreign  11.72528  16.38306  4.54  1.594999  4.644019  16.28 
Director  12.23599  15.55293  4.86  1.444706  4.597163  19.24 
Institutional  1.913807  5.907399  0  3.967472  19.38941  0.06 
Corporate  24.16325  18.77791  21.2  0.5431714  2.485669  28.93 
Year  1995 
Observations  388 
Dividends  2.938144  14.28489  0  9.869967  117.8254  1 
Dividend-Growth  1.54375  5.095129  0  5.649618  41.0604  1 
Net-Profit  12.35598  65.01537  2  12.13952  183.8876  5.955 
Earnings-Growth  6.617813  24.31146  1.045  5.458111  41.09897  4.17 
Sales  151.2843  496.5644  37.855  9.391906  113.5415  95.575 
Total-Assets  205.1705  774.7791  39.695  10.14814  131.8623  92.85 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  2.69634  34.72632  0.905  18.32863  354.5862  1.135 
PBDIT  26.68791  109.3448  5.325  11.59221  171.1414  13.705 
Equity-Capital  14.59121  36.90056  5.55  7.577526  74.56128  8.385 
Operating Cash Flow  13.83193  80.68955  0  11.93618  181.1418  4.75 
Total Income  157.579  514.1655  38.73  9.369258  113.4672  97.115 
Foreign  10.99095  15.09072  4.61  1.791602  5.697582  15.55 
Director  16.04964  18.59596  8.52  1.217778  3.683671  25.75 
Institutional  1.949691  5.970014  0  5.068885  36.28111  0.105 
Corporate  23.64312  18.61042  19.955  0.675519  2.720998  29.875  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Skewness Kurtosis IQR (Inter 
Quartile 
Range) 
Year  1996 
Observations  776 
Dividend-Growth  0.4931973 8.635091  0  2.483092  99.25519  0 
Net-Profit  10.99284  57.20673  1.4  16.36628  346.4207  5.945 
Earnings-Growth  3.251871  25.25496  0.4099999  -0.6377308 76.28138  3.12 
Sales  145.5972  447.394  31.16  9.79371  137.4928  105.74 
Total-Assets  185.0257  727.9422  36.005  13.35779  242.2491  91.605 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  2.54E+13  7.07E+14  0.78  27.8029  774.0013  1.08 
PBDIT  25.65615  95.61308  4.52  11.58357  188.2903  15.57 
Equity-Capital  13.56183  29.75849  5.66  8.083285  93.8609  7.46 
Operating Cash Flow  15.41603  71.74774  1.59  13.54981  254.6491  9.43 
Total Income  151.8276  468.5583  32.215  9.807343  138.097  108.52 
Foreign  10.45977  14.97933  4.48  1.970004  6.334062  13.085 
Director  17.0529  18.37928  11.175  1.101875  3.48244  27.235 
Institutional  1.736121  5.189585  0  4.969405  36.65374  0.06 
Corporate  23.5614  18.39632  19.79  0.6813302  2.717408  28.94 
Year  1997 
Observations  843 
Dividends  2.809015  13.95336  0  13.66839  256.8686  1 
Dividend-Growth  0.4662698 4.441676  0  8.556034  107.5426  0 
Net-Profit  8.342242  54.31797  0.71  18.05476  414.3737  4.99 
Earnings-Growth  -3.092877  18.2358  -0.2349999  -5.156015  46.95471  2.455 
Sales  162.6643  494.2121  36.03  9.713402  137.1393  109.03 
Total-Assets  212.8861  862.2407  39.38  15.08729  310.599  105.09 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  1.009417  8.154612  0.86  6.525897  218.6699  1.15 
PBDIT  27.38153  101.0078  4.47  11.50569  193.8081  15.96 
Equity-Capital  14.64259  33.25432  6.05  7.524099  76.32997  7.76 
Operating Cash Flow  20.14495  94.35436  2.33  13.16587  236.794  11.72 
Total Income  168.0072  508.4679  36.45  9.553075  132.9083  113.42 
Foreign  10.842  15.97831  3.95  1.979588  6.405052  13.78 
Director  17.4837  18.66517  11.57  1.143167  3.788099  27.8 
Institutional  1.55032  4.673506  0  5.380681  44.86148  0.08 
Corporate  25.51754  19.67958  22.44  0.648637  2.735296  32.26  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Skewness  Kurtosis  IQR (Inter 
Quartile 
Range) 
Year  1998 
Observations  1201 
Dividends  3.251457  21.74584  0  18.01424  387.9828  1 
Dividend-Growth  -0.0298013  6.050295  0  6.241255  147.6791  0 
Net-Profit  8.298351  63.72215  0.73  15.67359  332.6366  6.05 
Earnings-Growth  -0.5048509  19.12619  -0.0100  3.910542  66.97831  2.635 
Sales  192.1618  646.5114  46.21  12.5053  211.871  137.05 
Total-Assets  262.492  1023.234  50.85  14.13554  285.1144  149.13 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  1.140125  6.794416  0.875  2.275559  142.4375  1.28 
PBDIT  30.13387  121.1573  5.2  13.65977  270.009  18.49 
Equity-Capital  17.91868  51.93716  6.59  11.05148  164.2712  9.26 
Operating Cash Flow  22.69403  120.6769  2.81  18.76104  473.0153  12.81 
Total Income  197.8052  670.227  46.41  12.64907  217.7005  138.56 
Foreign  11.69159  17.58171  3.86  1.948069  6.206544  14.41 
Director  17.27679  19.14122  10.34  1.153718  3.656181  28.24 
Institutional  1.782306  5.448266  0  4.88245  33.52673  0.07 
Corporate  25.57475  20.10942  21.73  0.637666  2.646784  32.28 
Year  1999 
Observations  624 
Dividends  3.625  31.34585  0  19.59808  426.1173  1 
Dividend-Growth  0.700831  9.672368  0  17.69664  329.017  0 
Net-Profit  5.978125  55.27748  0.38  13.28229  240.6061  5.785 
Earnings-Growth  -0.3290027  23.18149  -0.05  3.66198  62.84842  3.32 
Sales  185.8606  591.5369  44.485  11.7545  190.0638  148.595 
Total-Assets  237.8205  701.2339  53.22  7.594618  73.34325  169.46 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  0.1791653  28.56545  0.77  -19.32295  467.5678  1.4 
PBDIT  26.68465  95.14216  4.765  9.942336  130.9438  19.43 
Equity-Capital  17.65819  54.73713  6.705  12.83977  206.8435  10.265 
Operating Cash Flow  22.95739  85.05983  2.98  9.953038  137.6494  15.255 
Total Income  189.7717  608.769  44.815  11.9134  194.7889  152.035 
Foreign  10.74279  17.01581  3.305  2.060138  6.604456  12.355 
Director  18.72756  19.9137  12.59  1.031446  3.261527  29.485 
Institutional  1.723109  5.453934  0  5.887923  48.92631  0.155 
Corporate  26.33043  21.06445  22.27  0.7485803  2.900836  32.645  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Skewness  Kurtosis  IQR (Inter 
Quartile 
Range) 
Year  2000 
Observations  1995 
Dividends  3.407531  19.3503  0  14.99784  304.6753  1 
Dividend-Growth  0.7238806  4.100966  0  4.894653  30.61888  0 
Net-Profit  8.349464  87.74391  0.41  18.42427  476.7241  5.3 
Earnings-Growth  -0.2679108  30.76639  0.01  -2.006242  29.57728  5.01 
Sales  207.7467  793.7086  43.6  16.20523  365.5868  136.24 
Total-Assets  280.4855  1200.65  48.55  15.23977  319.5355  145.67 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  1.110008  54.55585  0.72  -3.17305  550.1  1.39 
PBDIT  32.96192  172.2373  4.04  19.43403  499.2359  17.1 
Equity-Capital  19.58777  62.37926  6.3  11.39711  164.4125  10.6 
Operating Cash Flow  24.06945  102.519  2.21  10.13487  135.0329  12.28 
Total Income  214.0958  830.1617  44.75  16.67075  385.5376  139.26 
Foreign  10.20126  17.52547  1.68  2.22889  7.668262  11.26 
Director  17.63333  20.20792  10.36  1.203711  3.803419  28.99 
Institutional  1.594234  4.882547  0  4.650461  30.40444  0 
Corporate  29.82735  24.40191  25.73  0.773931  2.991131  37.36 
Year  Total 
Observations  5224 
Dividends  3.127297  19.71018  0  20.06615  546.1371  1 
Dividend-Growth  0.4662129  6.770699  0  11.92037  311.4547  0 
Net-Profit  8.823888  66.09174  0.84  18.06328  490.2082  5.495 
Earnings-Growth  -0.0017064  22.08932  0.02  0.921462  60.97185  2.84 
Sales  179.6613  613.3287  40.75  14.51154  334.4967  121.915 
Total-Assets  237.9011  939.2609  45.175  15.13918  344.2088  130.245 
Debt-Equity-Ratio  3.77E+12  2.73E+14  0.82  72.22188  5217  1.26 
PBDIT  28.90057  123.6202  4.76  17.96307  525.6795  17.045 
Equity-Capital  16.72554  48.03879  6.14  12.20835  208.3833  9.07 
Operating Cash Flow  20.03364  96.54302  1.885  15.37022  368.2992  10.795 
Total Income  185.2738  637.2126  41.595  14.87465  354.3771  125.525 
Foreign  10.86649  16.65778  3.495  2.032835  6.70571  13.07 
Director  17.25054  19.16205  10.575  1.164618  3.704373  28.245 
Institutional  1.705308  5.224912  0  5.063789  37.08057  0.06 
Corporate  26.13281  20.93689  22.385  0.7732868  3.09978  32.59 
 Table 4: Linter Model with Time, Industry, and Firm Dummies 
 
Divit – Div i(t-1)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ear  0.022  0.102  0.024  0.161 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.112)  (0.001)** 
Dividend-Lag1  -0.119  -0.579  -0.097  -1.007 
  (0.030)*  (0.005)**  (0.380)  (0.000)** 
Dividend-Lag2  0.087  0.287  -0.090  0.330 
  (0.039)*  (0.106)  (0.289)  (0.050)+ 
Group Dummy  0.178  0.170     
  (0.044)*  (0.843)     
Tax-Dummy  0.028       
  (0.989)       
Observations  1170  367  1170  367 
R-squared  0.236  0.479  0.661  0.840 
Industry Effect (p-value)  0.45  0.00     
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not r eported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Column 1, reports the 
result with 2 -digit industry and time dummy. Column 2, reports results only for firm 
with change in dividends (positive or negative). Column 3, reports results of fixed-
effects panel data regression, and column 4, reports the result of the fixed-effects 
panel data for firms with change in dividends. Table 5: Regression Results for Full Adjustment Model (FAM) 
 
Divit – Div i(t-1)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Earnings Growth (EG)  0.082  0.064  0.034 
  (0.000)**  (0.008)**  (0.145) 
EG*Institutional  -0.040  -0.053  -0.033 
  (0.001)**  (0.000)**  (0.050)* 
EG*Director  0.036  -0.005  0.004 
  (0.105)  (0.762)  (0.784) 
EG*Foreign  0.016  -0.019  0.019 
  (0.378)  (0.316)  (0.410) 
EG*Corporate  -0.013  -0.027  -0.003 
  (0.389)  (0.182)  (0.885) 
EG*Group  -0.015  -0.010  -0.003 
  (0.347)  (0.637)  (0.870) 
EG*Tax  -0.037  -0.004  0.001 
  (0.008)**  (0.785)  (0.928) 
Observations  2013  2013  2013 
R-squared  0.208  0.633  0.633 
Time Effect (p-value)  0.13  0.34  0.20 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Column 1, reports the 
result with 2 -digit industry and time dummy. Column 2, reports results of the fixed-
effects panel data for firms with indicator dummies at maximum for ownership 
variables, and column 3, reports results with indicator dummy at 25% for ownership 
variables. 
 Table 6: Regression Results of Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) 
 
Divit – Div i(t-1)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ear  0.062  0.093  0.071  0.044  0.045  0.056 
  (0.000)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)**  (0.085)+  (0.082)+  (0.016)* 
Ear*Institutional  -0.028  -0.001  -0.053  -0.002  0.002  -0.041 
  (0.000)**  (0.004)**  (0.000)**  (0.890)  (0.926)  (0.000)** 
Ear*Director  -0.005  -0.001  -0.028  -0.018  -0.007  -0.017 
  (0.616)  (0.063)+  (0.154)  (0.254)  (0.690)  (0.335) 
Ear*Foreign  -0.009  -0.001  -0.020  0.022  0.012  -0.006 
  (0.119)  (0.303)  (0.206)  (0.143)  (0.307)  (0.519) 
Ear*Corporate  -0.025  -0.001  -0.015  0.003  0.008  0.009 
  (0.000)**  (0.120)  (0.301)  (0.848)  (0.593)  (0.381) 
Ear*Group  -0.021  -0.023  -0.024  -0.029  -0.028  -0.027 
  (0.039)*  (0.310)  (0.270)  (0.172)  (0.176)  (0.229) 
Ear*Tax  -0.015  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.005  0.013 
  (0.066)+  (0.389)  (0.356)  (0.509)  (0.505)  (0.290) 
Dividend-Lag1  0.011  -0.269  -0.268  -0.274  -0.269  -0.291 
  (0.603)  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Observations  2013  2013  2013  2013  2013  2013 
R-squared  0.304  0.677  0.676  0.672  0.668  0.675 
Time Effect (p-value)  0.08  0.67  0.57  0.70  0.63  0.53 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  Column 1, reports the 
result with 2 -digit industry and time dummy. Column 2, reports results of the fixed-
effects panel data model. Column 2, reports results of the fixed-effects panel data for 
firms with indicator dummies at maximum for ownership variables, and column 4, 5, 
and 6 reports results with indicator dummies at 5%, 10%, and 25% for ownership 
variables, respectively. Table 7: Regression Results of Earnings Trend Model (ETM) 
 
Divit – Div i(t-1)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ear  0.026  0.045  0.043  0.038  0.040  0.045 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Ear-Lag1  0.017  0.020  -0.016  -0.037  -0.030  -0.025 
  (0.243)  (0.523)  (0.513)  (0.250)  (0.301)  (0.313) 
Ear-Lag1*Institutional  -0.005  0.000  0.028  0.002  0.024  0.040 
  (0.633)  (0.659)  (0.334)  (0.908)  (0.217)  (0.135) 
Ear-Lag1*Director  -0.008  -0.001  -0.033  -0.025  -0.029  -0.021 
  (0.525)  (0.009)**  (0.133)  (0.156)  (0.132)  (0.241) 
Ear-Lag1*Foreign  -0.009  -0.001  -0.015  0.012  0.005  -0.013 
  (0.203)  (0.129)  (0.421)  (0.478)  (0.729)  (0.263) 
Ear-Lag1*Corporate  -0.026  -0.001  -0.011  0.019  0.016  0.004 
  (0.001)**  (0.055)+  (0.524)  (0.303)  (0.393)  (0.730) 
Ear-Lag1*Group  -0.010  -0.001  0.007  0.003  -0.001  0.003 
  (0.349)  (0.978)  (0.748)  (0.894)  (0.967)  (0.895) 
Ear-Lag1*Tax  -0.012  0.012  0.012  0.007  0.008  0.018 
  (0.156)  (0.175)  (0.202)  (0.543)  (0.490)  (0.157) 
Dividend-Lag1  0.036  -0.234  -0.245  -0.255  -0.245  -0.257 
  (0.118)  (0.004)**  (0.003)**  (0.004)**  (0.005)**  (0.003)** 
Observations  2013  2013  2013  2013  2013  2013 
R-squared  0.304  0.676  0.670  0.668  0.671  0.674 
Time Effect (p-value)  0.08  0.79  0.73  0.80  0.76  0.67 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  Column 1, reports the 
result with 2 -digit industry and time dummy. Column 2, reports results of the fixed-
effects panel data for firms with actual shareholding. Column 3, reports results of the 
fixed-effects panel data for firms with indicator dummies at maximum for ownership 
variables, and column 4, 5, and 6 reports results with indicator dummies at 5%, 10%, 
and 25% for ownership variables, respectively. Table 8: Regression Results of Waud Model (WM) 
 
Divit – Div i(t-1)  (1)  (2) 
Ear  0.046  0.094 
  (0.001)**  (0.023)* 
Ear*Institutional  -0.037  -0.058 
  (0.000)**  (0.060)+ 
Ear*Director  -0.006  -0.042 
  (0.408)  (0.197) 
Ear*Foreign  -0.014  -0.050 
  (0.042)*  (0.143) 
Ear*Corporate  -0.031  -0.018 
  (0.000)**  (0.585) 
Ear*Group  -0.008  -0.045 
  (0.413)  (0.221) 
Ear*Tax  -0.004  0.006 
  (0.669)  (0.426) 
Dividend-Lag1  -0.037  -0.166 
  (0.183)  (0.095)+ 
Dividend-Lag2  0.040  -0.068 
  (0.040)*  (0.479) 
Observations  1170  1170 
R-squared  0.346  0.690 
Time Effect (p-value)  0.16  0.51 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Column 1, reports the 
result with 2 -digit industry and time dummy. Column 2, reports results of the fixed-
effects panel data model. Table 9: Regression Results of Proposed Model (PM) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Div Intit  None  Own  Own  Max  5  10  25 
Div Intensity Lag1  0.457  -0.003  -0.012  -0.003  -0.006  0.001  -0.008 
  (0.000)**  (0.952)  (0.819)  (0.952)  (0.917)  (0.985)  (0.882) 
Ear Intensity  0.101  0.070  0.070  0.071  0.070  0.071  0.071 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Ear Intensity Lag1  -0.015  0.016  0.017  0.014  0.016  0.016  0.015 
  (0.076)+  (0.139)  (0.086)+  (0.207)  (0.124)  (0.136)  (0.177) 
Debt Equity  -0.001  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.000)**  (0.018)*  (0.002)**  (0.018)*  (0.008)**  (0.012)*  (0.012)* 
Growth in Sales 
Intensity 
0.007  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  (0.000)**  (0.008)**  (0.005)**  (0.013)*  (0.013)*  (0.010)*  (0.013)* 
Foreign  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.884)  (0.976)  (0.709)  (0.067)+  (0.448)  (0.321)  (0.111) 
Institutional  0.000  -0.000  -0.001  0.007  -0.002  -0.003  0.005 
  (0.917)  (0.588)  (0.069)+  (0.004)**  (0.351)  (0.327)  (0.001)** 
Director  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.003 
  (0.999)  (0.075)+  (0.055)+  (0.147)  (0.123)  (0.368)  (0.117) 
Corporate  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.001 
  (0.369)  (0.304)  (0.052)+  (0.294)  (0.069)+  (0.443)  (0.145) 
(Foreign) 
2      -0.000         
      (0.575)         
(Institutional) 
2      0.000         
      (0.032)*         
(Director) 
2      -0.000         
      (0.166)         
(Corporate) 
2      -0.000         
      (0.053)+         
Group Dummy  -0.002             
  (0.005)**             
Tax Dummy  -0.001             
  (0.602)             
Time Effect (p-value)  0.02  0.54  0.48  0.49  0.54  0.58  0.42 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  Column 1, reports the 
result with 2 -digit industry and time dummy. Column 2, and 3 reports results of the 
fixed-effects panel data model for firms with actual shareholding. Column 4, reports 
results of the fixed-effects panel data for firms with indicator dummies at maximum 
for ownership variables, and column 5, 6, and 7 reports results with indicator 
dummies at 5%, 10%, and 25% for ownership variables, respectively. Table 10: Regression Results of the Spline Specification with Max Indicator 
 
Divit  - Div i (t-1)  FAM  PAM  WM  ETM 
EG  0.054       
  (0.449)       
EG*Foreign(..,5)  -0.003       
  (0.708)       
EG*Foreign(5,10)  0.008       
  (0.383)       
EG*Foreign(10,25)  -0.004       
  (0.004)**       
EG*Foreign(25,..)  0.003       
  (0.014)*       
EG*Director(..,5)  0.007       
  (0.325)       
EG*Director(5,10)  -0.008       
  (0.440)       
EG*Director(10,25)  0.002       
  (0.568)       
EG*Director(25,..)  -0.000       
  (0.920)       
EG*Institutional(..,5)  0.010       
  (0.206)       
EG*Institutional(5,10)  -0.004       
  (0.559)       
EG*Institutional(10,25)  -0.004       
  (0.065)+       
EG*Institutional(25,..)  -0.001       
  (0.651)       
EG*Corporate(..,5)  -0.013       
  (0.395)       
EG*Corporate(5,10)  0.009       
  (0.090)+       
EG*Corporate(10,25)  -0.001       
  (0.648)       
EG*Corporate(25,..)  -0.000       
  (0.828)       
Ear    0.097  0.084  0.040 
    (0.010)**  (0.109)  (0.000)** 
Ear*Foreign(..,5)    -0.002  -0.007   
    (0.632)  (0.330)   
Ear*Foreign(5,10)    0.013  0.016   
    (0.012)*  (0.027)*   
Ear*Foreign(10,25)    -0.005  -0.007   
    (0.003)**  (0.000)**   
Ear*Foreign(25,..)    0.002  0.003   
    (0.048)*  (0.000)**   
Ear*Director(..,5)    0.004  0.007   
    (0.550)  (0.449)   
Ear*Director(5,10)    -0.005  -0.002   
    (0.581)  (0.850)   
Ear*Director(10,25)    0.001  0.002       (0.659)  (0.582)   
Ear*Director(25,..)    -0.001  -0.001   
    (0.453)  (0.323)   
Ear*Institutional(..,5)    0.000  -0.005   
    (0.930)  (0.495)   
Ear*Institutional(5,10)    0.002  0.011   
    (0.698)  (0.327)   
Ear*Institutional(10,25)    -0.003  -0.005   
    (0.079)+  (0.178)   
Ear*Institutional(25,..)    -0.001  -0.000   
    (0.354)  (0.828)   
Ear*Corporate(..,5)    -0.017  -0.011   
    (0.018)*  (0.166)   
Ear*Corporate(5,10)    0.007  0.002   
    (0.074)+  (0.728)   
Ear*Corporate(10,25)    -0.001  0.001   
    (0.778)  (0.725)   
Ear*Corporate(25,..)    -0.001  -0.001   
    (0.077)+  (0.440)   
Dividend Lag1    -0.307  -0.227  -0.238 
    (0.000)**  (0.006)**  (0.004)** 
Dividend Lag2      -0.067   
      (0.341)   
Ear Lag1        0.008 
        (0.856) 
Ear Lag1*Foreign(..,5)        -0.003 
        (0.620) 
Ear Lag1*Foreign(5,10)        0.008 
        (0.177) 
Ear Lag1*Foreign(10,25)        -0.003 
        (0.108) 
Ear Lag1*Foreign(25,..)        -0.000 
        (0.966) 
Ear Lag1*Director(..,5)        0.003 
        (0.593) 
Ear Lag1*Director(5,10)        -0.011 
        (0.221) 
Ear Lag1*Director(10,25)        0.003 
        (0.330) 
Ear Lag1*Director(25,..)        -0.000 
        (0.719) 
Ear Lag1*Institutional(..,5)        -0.005 
        (0.464) 
Ear Lag1*Institutional(5,10)        0.006 
        (0.555) 
Ear Lag1*Institutional(10,25)        -0.001 
        (0.769) 
Ear Lag1*Institutional(25,..)        0.001 
        (0.433) 
Ear Lag1*Corporate(..,5)        -0.008 
        (0.401) 
Ear Lag1*Corporate(5,10)        0.006         (0.137) 
Ear Lag1*Corporate(10,25)        0.001 
        (0.780) 
Ear Lag1*Corporate(25,..)        -0.001 
        (0.049)* 
Observations  2013  2013  1170  2013 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  Column  1, reports the 
result for FAM, column 2, for PAM, Column 3, for Waud Model, and column 4, for 
ETM. Table: 11 Results of Explaining Ownership with Dividends Trend 
 
Panel: A  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Institutional Foreign Corporate Director 
Dividend Intensity lag1  -17.5144  4.7531  41.9501  2.5277 
  (0.205)  (0.900)  (0.235)  (0.918) 
Dividend Intensity lag2  -13.0433  -57.3529  -66.1758  68.0992 
  (0.212)  (0.388)  (0.544)  (0.321) 
Dividend Intensity lag3  -18.1479  17.7011  -10.0367  -15.4746 
  (0.101)  (0.870)  (0.904)  (0.777) 
Panel: B         
  Institutional Foreign Corporate Director 
Dividend Lag1  -0.0423  -0.1804  0.1126  -0.0200 
  (0.155)  (0.256)  (0.150)  (0.240) 
Dividend Lag2  -0.0202  -0.0975  0.0599  0.0028 
  (0.327)  (0.407)  (0.425)  (0.792) 
Dividend Lag3  0.0280  0.0425  -0.0255  -0.0038 
  (0.319)  (0.802)  (0.787)  (0.782) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  Column 1, reports the 
result for Institutional ownership as dependent variables. Column 2, 3, and 4 report 
for the regression results for Foreign, Corporate, and Director’s ownership as 
dependent variable, respectively. 
 Table: 12 Three Stage Least Squares (3SLSS) Regression 
 
Growth in Institutional Coefficient  P-value 
Earnings Intensity Lag1  -1.3243  (0.317) 
Earnings Intensity Lag2  -0.8284  (0.604) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag1  -4.6786  (0.708) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag2  -5.4119  (0.663) 
Growth in Corporate     
Earnings Intensity Lag1  7.4910  (0.010)* 
Earnings Intensity Lag2  -8.5729  (0.015)* 
Dividend Intensity_Lag1  -24.5882  (0.371) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag2  13.9739  (0.609) 
Growth in Director     
Earnings Intensity Lag1  -0.8154  (0.783) 
Earnings Intensity Lag2  5.0031  (0.162) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag1  2.9398  (0.916) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag2  -11.9800  (0.666) 
Growth in Foreign     
Earnings Intensity Lag1  -0.8592  (0.677) 
Earnings Intensity Lag2  -0.5709  (0.819) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag1  -2.8210  (0.885) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag2  21.2935  (0.270) 
Dividend Intensity     
Foreign  1.73E-05  (0.620) 
Institutional  -2.82E-05  (0.698) 
Director  3.27E-05  (0.256) 
Corporate  -7.69E-06  (0.791) 
(Foreign) 
2  3.81E-07  (0.536) 
(Institutional) 
2  2.48E-07  (0.901) 
(Director) 
2  -2.69E-07  (0.602) 
(Corporate) 
2  5.60E-07  (0.279) 
Earnings Intensity  1.90E-02  (0.000)*** 
Earnings Intensity Lag1  -5.43E-03  (0.058) 
Dividend Intensity_Lag1  8.25E-01  (0.000)*** 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 Table: 13 Regression Results for Different Measures of Performance 
   
Dividend Intensity  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ROA  ROE  Sales Intensity 
Dividend Intensity (t-1)  -0.015  -0.014  -0.010 
  (0.783)  (0.792)  (0.854) 
Earnings Intensity  0.068  0.069  0.069 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Earnings Intensity (t-1)  0.016  0.016  0.017 
  (0.111)  (0.108)  (0.099)+ 
Debt Equity  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.003)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Growth in Sales Intensity  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  (0.011)*  (0.006)**  (0.005)** 
Foreign  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.571)  (0.763)  (0.697) 
Institutional  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.074)+  (0.034)*  (0.133) 
Director  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.439)  (0.252)  (0.243) 
Corporate  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.047)*  (0.055)+  (0.104) 
Square of Foreign  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.647)  (0.551)  (0.597) 
Square of Institutional  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.031)*  (0.025)*  (0.030)* 
Square of Director  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.237)  (0.260)  (0.269) 
Square of Corporate  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.044)*  (0.049)*  (0.067)+ 
Performance*(Growth Foreign)  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.417)  (0.561)  (0.826) 
Performance *(Growth Institutional)  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.840)  (0.246)  (0.433) 
Performance *(Growth Corporate)  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.694)  (0.935)  (0.733) 
Performance *(Growth Director)  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.096)+  (0.449)  (0.466) 
Observations  753  753  753 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics.  Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  
Table: 14 Table for Different Measures of Dividend Intensity 
 
Dividend Intensity t  Operating Cash Flow  Total Income 
Dividend Intensity (t-1)  -0.001  0.126 
  (0.140)  (0.033)* 
Earnings Intensity  0.067  0.059 
  (0.028)*  (0.000)** 
Earnings Intensity (t-1)  0.023  0.009 
  (0.506)  (0.427) 
Debt Equity  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.314)  (0.861) 
Growth in Sales Intensity  0.012  -0.001 
  (0.128)  (0.276) 
Foreign  0.000  0.000 
  (0.887)  (0.128) 
Institutional  -0.005  -0.000 
  (0.186)  (0.313) 
Director  0.002  0.000 
  (0.355)  (0.093)+ 
Corporate  0.003  0.000 
  (0.092)+  (0.199) 
Square of Foreign  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.903)  (0.712) 
Square of Institutional  0.000  0.000 
  (0.220)  (0.232) 
Square of Director  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.414)  (0.142) 
Square of Corporate  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.189)  (0.181) 
Observations  1730  762 
 
Numbers in parentheses are p -values of t -statistics. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Intercept term is used in the regression but not reported here. + 
significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.  
                                                 
1 This dummy takes the value of one before 1997 and zero otherwise. 
2 See Waud (1966) for detailed derivation of the model.   
3 We, however, note that this has the disadvantage of relying on the past to measure for the future 
investment opportunities. 
4 The threshold for the ‘institution’ occurs at 17.3% while that of ‘corporate’ at 30.5%. 
5 Spline nodes are created to allow for a piecewise linear relation between the two variables, growth in 
dividends payout and the ownership structure, this technique allows the slope of the regression 
equation to change at spline nodes and ensures that the regression line is continuous at the different 
spline nodes, which is unlikely to be the case if one uses a slope dummy instead. Say, we define spline 
nodes at 5, 10, and 25. Then, under the spline technique, four spline variables (the number of spline 
variables is always one more than the number of knots) are defined as follows: 
Spline1  = 5 if x‡5 
= x if x < 5 
Spline2  = 5 if x ‡ 10 
= x - 5 if 5 < x < 10 
= 0 if x < 10 
Spline3  = 15 if x ‡ 25 
= x - 10 if 10 < x < 25 
= 0 if x < 25 
Spline4  = x - 25 if x > 25 
= 0 if x < 25 
A piecewise linear relation between y and x is then be obtained by running a linear regression with the 
four spline variables. 
6 The author is thankful to the referee for suggesting this point. 